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Abstract: 
For several decades public enterprises have been criticised for their poor economic perform-
ance. Many economists take it as “conventional wisdom” that publicly owned enterprises are 
inefficient by their very nature. This seemed to be proved by what is probably the most cited 
survey worldwide, that was written by Megginson and Netter (2001). They claim: “Research 
now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profit-
able than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms” (p. 380). The objective of this paper is to 
question the proposition that public enterprises are necessarily less efficient as their private 
counterparts. In doing so, we argue that profits are not a reasonable performance measure for 
public enterprises. However, our main focus is to present a much more comprehensive review 
of the empirical evidence than was provided by Megginson and Netter. The evidence indi-
cates that these authors’ conclusions were biased in favour of privatization despite the evi-
dence indicating that the true picture is much more differentiated. 
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1. Introduction 
In the economic literature, as well as in public debates, the economic performance of public 
enterprises is most often regarded as inferior to that of private enterprise. This assumption, 
strongly supported not only by certain political parties but also by international organizations 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was surely one of the main 
drivers of privatization campaigns worldwide. Another motivation for privatization is special 
interest – privatization can generate large amounts of wealth for some people or create large 
(privately held) shareholder value (see e.g. Parker 2003, 96) even while the majority of soci-
ety loses out (see e.g. Stiglitz 2008, XI). 
The objective of this contribution is to question the popular belief, occasionally termed as the 
“conventional wisdom”, of the superiority of private enterprises. A substantial foundation of 
this belief is some empirical works or surveys of empirical works from the past several dec-
ades of accrued research. Clearly, the most referenced of these is a survey by Megginson and 
Netter (2001) entitled “From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on Privatization”. 
In what follows we try to present, as far as possible, a compilation of empirical results on this 
topic including more recent evidence than has yet been gathered in one place. In doing so, we 
will see that the empirical evidence on this issue is today very differentiated. 
Because there is an almost unmanageable amount of single studies on this issue, a compre-
hensive first-hand examination of the international literature is beyond the scope of this paper 
(and beyond the capabilities of the author as well). Instead, we will focus on the results of 
surveys. We present the fundamental results of these surveys, cite the core conclusions of the 
authors and provide a discussion.  
Another limitation imposed on this study is the existing literature’s emphasis on developed or 
industrialized countries (“the western world”). The western world exhibits (relatively) well 
designed institutions, relatively less corruption and nepotism, and fair political competition 
for votes. Therefore we can expect the existence of effective market and regulatory mecha-
nisms (Bradburd 1996).1 Under these circumstances it is safely assumed that private firms are 
less able to exploit monopoly power and are more efficient than in countries lacking these 
characteristics. For this reason, the results presented here may not apply to less developed 
countries or transition economies.  
                                                 
1  For differences between developed and developing countries see e.g. Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) or Bou-
bakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005). 
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Strictly speaking, drawing comparisons between public enterprises and private enterprises 
necessarily entails some simplification. Both groups of enterprises are inhomogeneous. Public 
enterprises may be state owned or municipal owned and can take on different legal and orga-
nizational forms. Private enterprises could be public corporations with either widespread or 
concentrated ownership (this, for example, is the focus of the widely known book by Berle 
and Means, 1932), or they may belong to a single entrepreneur. So, when we speak about 
public enterprises or private enterprises, we are speaking in both cases of enterprises that can 
have quite different forms of ownership, and varied legal and organizational structures.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short presentation of possible reasons 
for a systematic difference between public and private enterprises. Section 3 addresses the 
question of proper measures for efficiency. Section 4 presents the results of 19 surveys on the 
relative performance/efficiency of public and private enterprises as well as the evidence from 
two meta-analyses. A final discussion is provided in section 5. 
 
2. Factors determining differences in performance (theoretical models) 
If we presume a difference exists in the economic performance of public versus private enter-
prises then there must be some mechanism(s) behind this difference. While many theories 
have been posited on this matter, due to space limitations I will shortly present (only) a few 
selected theoretical approaches used to explain possible economic performance differences.2
The widely advocated property rights approach (Alchian 1965) provides the theoretical (and 
perhaps ideological) basis for most of the early empirical work. According to this approach, 
variations in the separation and attenuation of property rights explain differences in perform-
ance. Since property rights in public enterprises are most often distributed worse than in pri-
vate enterprises, we can expect there to almost always be inferior incentives in public enter-
prises. Inferior incentives in turn imply inferior efficiency too. More recent theoretical work 
goes beyond this (over-)simplistic paradigm and is based on more formal analysis.  
Another class of theoretical models employs principal-agent theory (see for example Shapiro 
and Willig 1989; Pint 1991; de Fraja 1993). There is also a category of models that picks up 
on the idea of incomplete contracts (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1991; Schmidt 1996a, 1996b; 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The results of all of these models depend on their assump-
tions and parameter values. With any given assumption, there is a “critical” parameter values 
                                                 
2  For more comprehensive overviews of theoretical models on the issue see e.g. Villalonga 2000, Cavaliere 
and Scabrosetti (2008). 
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that determines whether public or private ownership is advantageous. To put it differently: 
Under some circumstances private ownership is favourable and under other conditions public 
ownership is advantageous.  
The aforementioned models and approaches rely on the assumption that individuals behave as 
homo economicus (economic man). This neglects phenomena like intrinsic (see e.g. Frey 
1997) or public service motivation (see e.g. Houston 2000; Wright 2001). Despite the difficul-
ties faced when integrating any departures from economic man into mathematical analysis, 
we would expect that intrinsic motivation, for example, is critical for a better understanding of 
the (relative) efficiency of public and private enterprise. Thus, it could explain a significant 
part of the difference (if any) in their performance. 
In summary, the results of current theoretical analyses are ambiguous. Current theory pro-
vides no reason to believe with any certainty that private enterprises in general perform better 
than public enterprises or vice versa.  
 
3. Proper performance measures for public enterprises 
Before comparing public and private enterprise we have to consider what constitutes reason-
able measures of economic performance. A useful starting point for these considerations is to 
consider first the purpose of public enterprises. In this context we should distinguish between 
the (so-called) welfare approach and the public choice approach. 
According to the welfare approach, the economic rationale for public enterprises is (static or 
dynamic) market failure (see e.g. Rees 1984). Against this background, public enterprises are 
seen as a means to counter market failure, most notably in cases of natural monopolies or 
negative externalities. Without market failure there is no reason to have public enterprises. In 
other words: Comparisons between publicly and privately-owned enterprises are only relevant 
in market failure conditions.  
Market failure is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the existence of public 
enterprises. An alternative institutional arrangement is regulated private firms. So (necessarily 
in cases of market failure) it is reasonable to look at the social costs and benefits of private 
and public enterprises, or their welfare effects. Usually, we measure social costs and benefits 
in terms of consumer surplus and producer surplus or as total surplus. Therefore, welfare 
measures are (theoretically) adequate indicators of the performance of private and public en-
terprises in general. However, measuring welfare effects is rife with difficulties and requires 
data that are often not available. 
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For this reason the comparison of public and private enterprises mostly rests, in our context, 
upon management accounting or financial accounting data. Financial accounting essentially 
provides data on profit, debt, and equity. Management accounting delivers information about 
costs, revenues, and outputs. If we assume that public enterprises are welfare orientated, they 
will probably not pursue the goal of profit maximizing in most cases. This is because profit 
maximizing behaviour is contradictory to welfare maximization in environments with less or 
no competition. Welfare maximization requires average cost or Ramsey pricing (as a second 
best solution) and does not leave profits above opportunity costs. This is a sufficient reason 
not to use profits or other related financial data in order to compare public and private enter-
prises. Otherwise, we would be comparing “apples and oranges”.  
In contrast, productive efficiency (synonymous to “productivity”) and cost efficiency (syn-
onymous to “internal efficiency”) are, together with price efficiency, not only consistent with 
welfare maximization but also necessary conditions for achieving maximum welfare.3 Hence, 
meaningful analysis of the (relative) performance of public and private enterprises can only be 
based on productivity and cost measures, with the optional inclusion of prices. In terms of 
surplus measures there are conditions under which public enterprises are preferred, even 
though they convey higher production costs than private firms (see e.g. Ceriani and Florio 
2011). 
The public choice approach provides the political rationale for public enterprises. In this con-
nection public enterprise could be treated as an instrument for the pursuit of political goals. 
Politicians may simply be acting as “rent-seekers”, or they may be dissatisfied with market 
outcomes and use public enterprises as a device for their political agenda. From this point of 
view public enterprises can act on a macroeconomic level to correct income distribution, em-
ployment rates, investment levels, and so on. Such goals or outcomes could be classified as 
“socio-economic” or “nonmarket output”. Thus, public enterprises provide several market and 
nonmarket outputs or goods. Therefore, it is not completely beside the point to assess the per-
formance of public enterprises against corresponding policy objectives (see e.g. Backhaus 
1994).  
If we consider public enterprises as multi-product firms providing market and nonmarket out-
puts or outcomes, then we obtain the usual representation of a transformation or production 
possibility curve. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical transformation curve in a two-output case. 
Let us assume that there are two decision making units (DMUs). Both DMUs are on the effi-
                                                 
3  Pestieau and Perelman 1993 argue in favour of productivity. 
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ciency frontier. DMU1 (maybe called “public enterprise”) provides more of the non-market 
and less of the market output, whereas DMU2 (maybe called “private enterprise”) produces 
less of the non-market and more of the market output. Both DMUs are efficient from a two-
dimensional perspective. However, from a pure market output perspective, DMU1 seems to be 
inefficient. In contrast, from a pure nonmarket view DMU2 is inefficient.  
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Figure 1. Market versus nonmarket goods on the production possibility curve 
 
Ignoring the question of whether or not the concept of socio-economic output is useful, we 
still have, just like with the welfare measures, a measurement problem. Under normal condi-
tions it is almost impossible to obtain meaningful data about nonmarket output. However, if 
we analyse the performance of public and private enterprises solely with market data, it is 
important to keep in mind that there could be a “second dimension” of nonmarket goods that 
is probably produced exclusively by public enterprises. There is no reason to assume that pri-
vate, profit maximizing firms would be apt to provide a nonmarket output.  
Consequently, we should ideally look at both market and nonmarket goods. Unfortunately, 
empirically this is not easily done in most cases. If considering market goods and using mar-
ket data, then we should use productivity, cost efficiency, or welfare indicators (consumer’s 
and producer’s surpluses). Profits, sales, and financial rates are rather useless in our context.4 
                                                 
4  The use of profits or sales and related data as performance variables is not appropriate for less- or non-com-
petitive markets. Sales and profits could be inconsistent with welfare objectives simply due to exploitation 
of monopoly power on both, output- and input-markets. 
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The majority of the subsequently examined empirical studies are, to at least some extent and 
often a great extent, far from meeting the aforementioned theoretical needs. Only a minority 
of the existing empirical studies even come close to meeting these standards. Many of the 
analyses concentrate on profits, sales, various financial ratios, and so on. Nevertheless, these 
studies are part of the literature and are influencing the discussion.  
 
4. Empirical results to date 
In the last decades a nearly unmanageable number of studies have appeared on the topic of 
interest to this paper. For this reason some limitations must be imposed on this review. a) First 
of all, we will only examine surveys. b) Secondly, we focus on surveys with empirical studies 
predominantly of the western world.5 c) Additionally, only surveys containing at least some 
studies using cost and productivity measures are included. d) Lastly, contracting out and 
competitive tendering is beyond the scope of this paper and thus, not considered (on this topic 
see e.g. Hodge 2000).6  
These constraints left us with exactly 16 surveys of the literature in a quantitative, schedular 
format. Beyond these, there are many small qualitative, non-schedular reviews of empirical 
studies. We will present only three early released qualitative format surveys. This is because 
later surveys in this format are small and give us no significant additional information com-
pared to the more extensive quantitative surveys. In addition to the surveys we found two 
relevant meta-analyses, whose results are also reported here. 
The studies summarized in the surveys differ regarding some of their major characteristics. a) 
Most (predominantly the older studies) use ordinary least squares, but others (the more recent 
studies) use frontier approaches. b) Most studies are cross-sectional; only a minority use time-
series or panel data. c) Some studies focus on only one industry; other studies consider mis-
cellaneous industries. d) The majority of studies use several performance measures. Only one 
survey article is limited to a single measure of performance.  
                                                 
5  There is a huge amount of recent studies concerning developing and less developed economies in East and 
South Asia, Africa, and South and Middle America. There are also many studies using data from transition 
economies in Europe. Furthermore, there are several surveys with a focus on these parts of the world (see 
e.g. Djankov and Murell 2002; Megginson and Sutter 2006; Estrin et. al. 2009) providing mixed evidence. 
6  Contracting out would compare production cost of public ownership with prices or payments of the public 
sector to private enterprises (including profits) and not with the cost of private enterprises. 
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The surveys, more or less, had access to the same population of stand-alone studies. Espe-
cially the samples of the older surveys overlap rather strongly. In total, the surveys reviewed 
here include approximately 250 different studies.  
In what follows we first review three early qualitative surveys.7 Subsequently, we discuss the 
quantitative surveys. The results concerning the relative performance of public and private 
enterprises are integrated into Table 1, but only for surveys comprising a minimum of 25 
studies. Lastly we present the findings of the meta-analyses. 
 
Qualitative review articles  
Bennett and Johnson (1980) review about 20 U.S. studies released from 1965 to 1978 which 
addressed a range of different industries such as electricity supply, refuse collection, health 
care and hospitals.8 The authors conclude: “[…] the private sector would have appeared even 
more efficient than the public sector. […] The private sector-production of public services 
offers an excellent opportunity for tax reduction without sacrifice of services …” (Bennet and 
Johnson 1980, 393). 
De Alessi (1980) summarizes the results of 28 studies published from 1965 to 1979.9 Most of 
the studies again used U.S. data and addressed several different sectors. De Allessi concludes: 
“The evidence regarding the consequences of government ownership is rich and varied” (De 
Alessi 1980, 41). He asserts that public enterprises often charged lower prices, had higher 
costs, favoured voters to non-voters or more politically active groups to less active groups, 
and so on. “Although some of the results must be regarded as tentative pending more rigorous 
tests, the evidence is overwhelming. Differences in the structures of rights to use resources 
affect behaviour systematically and predictably” (De Alessi 1980, 42). 
Millward and Parker (1983) depict, in non-schedular form, 31 studies of the UK, U.S., Can-
ada, Switzerland, and Indonesia that also cover several different sectors.10 The date of publi-
cation ranges from 1965 to 1980. The authors state “ [...] that there is no systematic evidence 
that public enterprises are less cost effective than private firms” (Millward and Parker 1983, 
                                                 
7  In subsequent years there appeared a multiplicity of small and very small (“mini”) qualitative surveys in 
textbooks that are impossible to present here completely. These include, for example, Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988, 39-43), Bös (1991, 50-52), Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994, 320-325), Aharoni (2000, 57-62), 
Florio (2004, 114-136), Bortolotti and Milella (2008, 55-60). 
8  This overview is an extension of Bennett and Johnson (1979). All studies in Bennett and Johnson (1979) are 
included in Bennett and Johnson (1980). 
9  Many of the studies cited here are included in De Alessi (1974). 
10  This summary is an extended version of Millward (1982). 
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258). It should be highlighted that, for the most part, Millward and Parker considered the 
same studies as De Alessi (1980) and Bennett and Johnson (1980). 
 
Quantitative review articles 
In an early and quite extensive survey Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider (1982) sum-
marize the results of 52 publications that appeared from 1965 to 1981. The survey spans 19 
different industries in North America, (Western) Europe, and Australia. Most articles found 
that private firms had superior economic performance. Only three studies (6%) found that 
public enterprises performed better while six contributions (12%) came to neutral results (see 
Table 1). Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider explain the neutral cases with reference 
to competition. They state: “To sum up the results so far: The literature seems to indicate that 
(a) private production is cheaper than production in publicly owned and managed firms, and 
(b) given sufficient competition between public and private producers (and no discriminative 
regulations and subsidies), the differences in unit cost turn out to be insignificant” (Borcher-
ding, Pommerehne, and Schneider 1982, 136). In addition, referring to the public choice ap-
proach, the authors point out that simple comparisons using the usual performance measures 
are misleading because they do not control for political goals (nonmarket output) and transac-
tion costs. “To conclude our paper: Government ‚‘waste’ is after all a sick consideration, ne-
glecting those sizeable costs of contracting, monitoring and controlling which may arise when 
private production is preferred over the public one. Also some part of the ‘waste’ is the result 
of the political process of redistribution, where public production is used as an efficient means 
for selecting and discriminating” (Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider 1982, 147). 
Boyd (1986) provides an overview of 17 papers written from 1970 to 1980. Most of these 
contributions examine garbage collection and electricity provision. Four papers found private 
enterprises to be more efficient than public enterprises. Four other studies found no differ-
ence. One author found either no difference or a superiority of public enterprise, depending on 
which efficiency indicator is used. Public enterprises were claimed to be more efficient than 
private enterprises in eight of the studies. “The unbiased observer may well agree with Mill-
ward, who concludes from his review of empirical studies of the property rights hypothesis 
that these studies do not provide general grounds for believing managerial efficiency to be 
less in public firms” (Boyd 1986, 192). 
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Domberger and Pigott (1986) extracted 13 studies from Borcherding, Pommerehne and 
Schneider (1982) and from Millward (1982) that showed no superiority of private firms.11 
Domberger and Pigott verified the existence of competition in six of the cases. They con-
cluded: “This strongly suggests that opening up a market to competition is crucial in promot-
ing improved economic performance. It provides tentative support for the belief […] that in at 
least some cases liberalization without ownership transfer will generate substantial improve-
ments in productive efficiency” (Domberger and Pigott 1986, 152). Furthermore, the authors 
presented 12 studies conducted from 1971 to 1985 which analyzed the efficiency of the two 
largest Australian airlines, one which was in private hands and the other which was public. 
Both Australian airlines performed worse than comparable North American airlines. In some 
cases the private Australian airline performed better than the state airline. However, in the 
majority of cases no difference between the two Australian airlines was found. “Privatization 
through asset sale can in some circumstances be worthwhile, yielding a reduction in resource 
waste in the overall economy. This assessment is consistent with, but not overwhelmingly 
supported by, the international comparisons of private and public sector performance. […] 
Where public enterprises operate in highly protected or regulated environment, deregulation 
or liberalization of the market may generate a substantial improvement in public sector per-
formance, without ownership transfer. This assessment is strongly supported by the interna-
tional evidence” (Domberger and Pigott 1986, 159). 
Turning to the next survey, Yarrow (1986) presented an overview of 28 studies published 
from 1971 to 1984 with data from the western world, primary from the U.S.A. Numerous 
different industries were covered in the study, including airlines, ferries, insurance, medicine, 
and water. This sample largely overlaps with the preceding studies. Yarrow stated that 17 
contributions showed the superiority of private production, six studies showed that public 
production is better (lower cost and prices, better quality), four studies were neutral, and one 
study had a mixed finding of pro/neutral on public ownership. “Where product markets are 
less monopolized, the comparative performance studies suggest a more favourable verdict on 
private enterprise, implying that incentive failures associated with government monitoring are 
empirically significant. … Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the results do point a presumption 
in favour of private ownership, provides that other market failures are insignificant or can be 
adequately corrected by means of alternative policy instruments” (Yarrow 1986, 375). 
Boardman and Vining (1989) compiled 55 studies which were released from 1965 to 1986. 
All data are from developed economies. Several sectors were analysed and distinct measures 
                                                 
11  This paper is published also in Bishop, Kay, and Mayer (1994). 
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of performance were used. The selected firms fulfilled at least one of the following condi-
tions: (a) the firm had a natural monopoly, (b) there was a regulated monopoly, or (c) prices 
were not set by competitive forces (this was not only the case in (a) and (b) but also in health 
services). Six studies (11%) showed a superiority of public enterprises. Sixteen (29%) studies 
revealed no significant differences and the result of 33 (60%) investigations found private 
firms have better economic performance. Boardman and Vining concluded: “A review [...] 
suggests an ‘edge’ for the private sector, but the results vary considerably across sectors. In 
sectors where there is some evidence of superior public efficiency (electricity and water), 
there is limited competition or the private firms are highly regulated” (Boardman and Vining 
1989, 5).  
The review of Pommerehne (1990) incorporates 105 single studies taken from seven sectors 
and published from 1965 to 1989. The overlap between this data and the data of the preceding 
surveys is not so strong as the overlap within the earlier surveys. The geographic scope of the 
studies is North America, Europe, and Australia. Several economic performance indicators 
such as productivity, costs profitability, and operating revenues were applied. Fifty-five 
(52%) of the studies revealed a better economic performance by private enterprises. Forty-two 
(40%) were not able to find any statistical difference and eight (8%) contributions showed 
that public enterprises are better performers. Broadly, Pommerehne concluded that it is not 
possible to say that private enterprises are generally preferable to public production. Effi-
ciency is fostered by competition and this holds for public and private enterprises. Without 
regulation Pommerehne expected the private sector to perform better. In the absence of com-
petition, but with regulation, Pommerehne believed that public enterprises could attain a bet-
ter, or at least no worse, performance than private enterprises (see Pommerehne 1990, 45).  
In a more recent publication Vining and Boardman (1992) extended their earlier work (see 
Boardman and Vining 1989). Vining and Boardman (1992) compiled a total of 95 studies. In 
contrast to the article from 1989 the population of studies is much more heterogeneous, as it 
comprises also enterprises in non-regulated, competitive environments. Still, nearly all studies 
focused on firms in industrialized countries. Unsurprisingly, after this alteration the pendulum 
moves in favour of private enterprises. Now seven studies (7% of the total) favourably view 
public enterprises, 20 publications are neutral, and 68 contributions (72%) come to the con-
clusion that private firms are superior to public enterprises. “Ownership does matter and there 
is strong evidence of superior PC [Private corporate] performance. This evidence is stronger 
than the previous literature suggests” (Vining and Boardman 1992, 218). 
countries industries total in % total in % total in %
1 Borcherding, Pommerehne, and 
Schneider (1982)
52 1965-1981 North America, Australia, 
Europe 
several several 43 82,69 6 11,54 3 5,77
2 Yarrow (1986) * 28 1971-1984 North America, Australia, 
Europe 
several several 17 60,71 4,5 16,07 6,5 23,21
3 Boardman and Vining (1989) 55 1965-1986 North America, Australia, 
Europe 
several several 33 60,00 16 29,09 6 10,91
4 Pommerehne (1990) 105 1965-1989 North America, Australia, 
Europe 
several several 55 52,38 42 40,00 8 7,62
5 Vining and Boardman (1992) 95 1965-1989 worldwide, not. North 
America and Europe
several several 68 71,58 20 21,05 7 7,37
6 Martin and Parker (1997) 63 1968-1995 worldwide, most not. 
developed countries
several several 35 55,56 17 26,98 11 17,46
Shirley and Walsh (2000) 52 1971-1999 worldwide several several 32 61,54 15 28,85 5 9,62
industrialized countries only 28 1971-1999 industrialized countries several several 12 42,86 11 39,29 5 17,86
Villalonga (2000) 153 1965-1997 notably developed countries several several 104 67,97 35 22,88 14 9,15
frontier-analysis only 20 1982-1997 notably developed 
countries
several production and 
cost efficiency 
9 45,00 5 25,00 6 30,00
9 Willner (2001) 68 1965-1998 worldwide, most not. 
developed countries
several production and 
cost efficiency 
21 30,88 26 38,24 21 30,88
10 Bel and Warner (2008) 35 1965-2007 worldwide, most not. 
developed countries
solid waste and 
water services
production and 
cost efficiency 
8 22,86 21 60,00 6 17,14
Arcas and Bachiller (2010) 28 1992-2007 worldwide several several 16 57,14 12 42,86        -     -
industrialized countries only 16 1992-2007 industrialized countries several several 8 50,00 8 50,00        -     -
private enterprise 
superior
neutral public enterprise 
superior
no. authors
no. of 
studies
period of 
publication
7
8
11
economic 
performance 
measures
 
*  In Yarrow (1986) one study is pro-public ownership concerning unit costs and neutral with regard to customer costs. Therefore, we count this study as 50 percent neutral and 50 
percent pro-public enterprise.  
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Table 1. The relative economic performance of publicly-owned and private-owned enterprises in different quantitative surveys
 
Pestieau and Tulkens (1993) collected 19 papers that focused on productive efficiency and 
were published from 1985 to 1993. These comparative studies look at very different branches 
of industry, ranging from airlines to the sugar industry. Some of them examine less developed 
countries. Only 14 of the studies sought to compare the productive efficiency of private and 
public firms. Five of these favoured private firms, the results of six were undetermined, and 
three favoured public firms. “On the basis of the work existing to date it appears that firm’s 
performance is quite independent of ownership, for a given competitive and regulatory set-
ting. In particular, there is no clear-cut performance differential between public enterprises 
and privately owned regulated firms. One also observes that introducing competition in-
creases performance regardless of ownership. Furthermore, the effect of deregulation, espe-
cially when it is only partial, appears to be rather ambiguous” (Pestieau and Tulkens 1993, 
319). 
Martin and Parker (1997) gathered 64 single studies that spanned the globe in their scope. In 
most cases these examined industrialized countries and distinct industries. The studies ap-
peared between 1968 and 1995. Thirty-five (56%) of these studies suggest a better perform-
ance by private firms. Seventeen (27%) papers find no verifiable differences between public 
and private enterprises. Eleven (17%) contributions give the advantage to public enterprises.12 
Martin and Parker conclude that there is no difference in regulated sectors: “ [...] the balance 
of evidence may be interpreted as favouring private ownership but only in competitive mar-
kets” (Martin and Parker 1997, 82). “On balance it seems that neither private nor public sector 
production is inherently or necessarily more efficient. In particular, where private sector firms 
remain state-regulated or protected from competition efficiency may suffer” (Martin and 
Parker 1997, 93). 
Based on some preceding surveys that were complemented with several studies not previously 
included, Shirley and Walsh (2000) constructed a synopsis of 52 studies. Most (35) of the 
studies in this data set use information from industrialized countries. Different sectors are 
examined and different measures of performance are employed. In the full data set 32 studies 
(62%) show private enterprises to be more efficient. Fifteen (29%) papers find no difference. 
Five studies (10%) conclude there is a better performance by public enterprises. If we exam-
ine industrialized countries exclusively, we see only 43 percent (12 studies) from a total of 28 
studies indicate private firms have superior performance, 11 (39%) studies do not find any 
difference, and five studies (18%) suggest public enterprises are superior. Looking exclu-
sively at markets with full competition, from a subsample of 16 studies 11 (69%) of them 
                                                 
12  This calculation is based on only 63 studies because, in our opinion, one study is un-interpretable. 
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demonstrate a better performance by private enterprise, while in five cases (31%) no differ-
ence is evident. Quite different from these results, in the 16 cases without competition only 
six (38%) reveal private firms to be superior. In this subset five (31%) neutral results and five 
(31%) results in favour of public enterprise are obtained. Shirley and Walsh summarize: “This 
body of empirical literature indicates that private or privatized ownership is superior to public 
ownership in a variety of situations. The balance of studies show that firm performance im-
proves after privatization. Private firms perform better in all market structures, although the 
relative ambiguity of this result in monopolies suggests that private ownership and competi-
tion are complements” (Shirley and Walsh 2000, 51). 
In what is probably the most comprehensive published survey Villalonga (2000) presents 153 
studies conducted from 1965 to 1997 of numerous countries worldwide. Nearly all studies are 
derived from earlier surveys. 13 Twenty of these studies apply the concept of efficiency fron-
tiers. From the total sample 104 studies (68%) provide evidence for a better performance by 
private enterprises. A further 35 (23%) contributions find no difference between the public 
and private sector while 14 (9%) publications indicate a preference for public enterprises. If 
we focus on the more recently published efficiency frontier studies on their own we see pri-
vate firms are favoured in 9 (45%) cases, neutral results are obtained in five (25%) cases, and 
an inferior performance by private enterprises is found in six (30%) cases. Villalonga com-
ments on her findings as follows: “ [...] although a simple count of results would give a con-
siderable edge to a private ownership […], the cumulative evidence is not wholly conclusive. 
Two factors play a significant role in explaining the diversity of results within these tables: 
the market structure of each of the industries (and countries) to which the firms studied be-
long, and the way their efficiency is measured” (Villalonga 2000, 46). “Still, after accounting 
for these two factors, the evidence about which form of ownership is associated with a higher 
level of efficiency remains mixed” (Villalonga 2000, 50). 
Megginson and Netter (2001) are the authors of what is possibly the most frequently cited 
paper in our context. They initially consider 10 very heterogeneous and arbitrarily selected 
publications released from 1989 to 2001 and which use cross-section data from cases across 
the world. One of these studies compares government financed and privately funded expedi-
tions to the Arctic from 1819-1909. Megginson and Netter conclude on this basis: “Research 
                                                 
13  This survey contains almost all but not all studies specified in De Alessi (1980), Millward (1982), Millward 
and Parker (1983), Boyd (1986), Domberger and Piggott (1986), Yarrow (1986), Boardman and Vining 
(1989), Vining and Boardman (1992), Perelman and Pestiau (1993), and Martin and Parker (1997). Not in-
cluded are at a time about 20 works cited in Pommerehne (1990) and Shirley and Walsh (2000). Moreover 
numerous publications mentioned in subsequent surveys (see e.g. Willner 2001) are not included. 
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now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profit-
able than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms” (Megginson and Netter 2001, 380). 
Moreover, Megginson and Netter present the results of a total of 22 articles using longitudinal 
data in non-transition economies, not only from developed economies but also from Latin 
America and other developing countries.14 These papers differ in how they compare perform-
ance changes resulting from privatization and were published in the period from 1994 to 
2001. Very diverse performance indicators are used, such as profit, sales, and capital spend-
ing. Most of these studies support privatization, though some provide mixed or conflicting 
results. However, our reading of two of the supposedly supporting papers is contradictory to 
the interpretation of Megginson and Netter. The authors construe insignificant regression co-
efficients as evidence of increasing operating efficiency after privatization.15 Megginson and 
Netter summarize: “These 22 studies offer at least limited support for the proposition that 
privatization is associated with improvements in the operating and financial performance of 
divested firms” (Megginson and Netter 2001, 356). However, it should be mentioned that 
many of these studies use – as argued above – irrelevant indicators, including profit, growth 
rates of the economy, and so on.  
Willner (2001) summarizes 68 publications from 1965 until 1998 concerning 14 industries. It 
is important to note that, with only four exceptions, all included studies came from industrial-
ized countries. A second important characteristic of this survey is that all incorporated studies 
focus on productive and cost efficiency. Twenty-one (31%) of the studies show private enter-
prises to be more efficient, 26 (38%) find no differences, and 21 (31%) are in favour of public 
enterprises. “With all caveats in mind, these tables are best summarised as suggesting that 
static cost efficiency alone is a poor criterion for the choice between private and public own-
ership. [...] But it seems that state enterprises tended to be more efficient in the West, with 
successful examples of public ownership in Scandinavia […] and even the US […], than in 
the former socialist countries” (Willner 2001, 735). 
Parker (2006) provides a survey of 21 time-series studies (which add up to 23 publications) of 
privatization in Great Britain that were published from 1991 to 2003 and which employ very 
distinct performance measures.16 Overall there is no convincing evidence of efficiency or 
welfare gains from the privatization programme. Productivity rose largely in line with growth 
                                                 
14  Moreover, the authors present six studies from transition economies and studies concerning the returns to 
investors. Both topics are beyond the scope of this paper. 
15  This holds for Verbrugge, Megginson, and Owens (2000) and D’Souza and Megginson (2000). The last 
paper is published as Bortolotti et. al. (2000). 
16  This contribution is an extended version of Parker (2003). 
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rates or trends before privatization. Welfare effects were ambiguous. Consumers gained few 
advantages, though profits and transfers to shareholders increased, inducing regressive redis-
tribution effects. Many of the results indicate that competition is more important than owner-
ship. “Ownership change on its own does not appear to have a significant effect in terms of 
improving economic performance where there is market dominance, especially in terms of 
welfare gains to consumers. Management in monopolies may seek an ‘easy life’ whether in 
the private or public sectors; while in private-sector monopolies management can meet inves-
tors’ expectations of profits by simply raising prices” (Parker 2006, 389). However, there is 
another effect that should not be disregarded. “At the same time, however, it would be wrong 
to dismiss the benefits of privatisation in the UK. Without privatisation it is probable that 
competition would not have been permitted or would have proved more difficult to produce, 
for example in electricity and gas supplies, and regulatory systems would have remained 
highly politicised. In other words, increased competition and improved state regulation of 
utilities may be a direct product of the privatisation process” (Parker 2006, 389). 
Bel and Warner (2008) summarize 35 studies from the solid waste collection and water distri-
bution sector.17 All waste sector studies come from the western world. The water sector stud-
ies are derived mostly from the western world. Furthermore, Bel and Warner considered re-
sults that are based only on cost and production functions. They state: “Empirical results for 
waste show the majority of studies find no systematic difference between public production 
and private production. While a few studies from the 1970s find cost savings with privatiza-
tion, these results do not persist over time. For water, only three studies found cost savings 
with privatization” (Bel and Warner 2008, 1341). 
The most recent survey to best of our knowledge is written by Arcas and Bachiller (2010). 
These authors collected 28 studies published from 1992 to 2007. About half of the studies 
stem from transition and less developed countries. Unlike the compilations of Willner (2001) 
and Bel and Warner (2008) the set of studies in this survey is very heterogeneous with respect 
to performance indicators adopted. Performance indicators in the underlying studies are 
profit, service quality, market valuation, sales, changes in compensation systems for top man-
agers after privatization, and so on. Sixteen papers (57%) indicate a better performance by 
private firms. The remaining 12 publications (43%) offer, in the words of Arcas and Ba-
chiller, “conflicting evidence”. Restricting the sample to developed countries, eight of 16 
studies (50%) give an advantage to private enterprises while the other eight studies (50%) 
show no benefit of privately owned firms. “There are several empirical studies that document 
                                                 
17  This paper completes the contribution of Bel and Costas (2006), which concerns only solid waste collection. 
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the differences in performance between state-owned and private firms and the effect of priva-
tization on the performance of privatized companies. Most of them conclude that private firms 
are more efficient than privatized companies and that SOEs [state owned enterprises] signifi-
cantly improve their efficiency after privatization. […] However, the evidence is not conclu-
sive. There is a considerable amount of literature that provides conflicting evidence about the 
improvements in the performance of privatized firms” (Arcas and Bachiller 2010, 488).  
 
Meta-Analyses 
The statistical technique of meta-analysis is widely used in the social and medical sciences 
and seems to have become popular in economics as well (see Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010). 
A meta-analysis can provide a statistical explanation for the differences in empirical results 
reported in the literature on a given topic. In our context, Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010 con-
ducted a meta-regression that is worthy of review here. A meta-regression tries to find the true 
value of different regression coefficients estimated in previous analysis. Therefore, regression 
results are needed.  
Bel, Fageda, and Warner (2010) had access to 27 studies of solid waste and water services on 
a local level with a total of 46 regression equations. All of these studies use the total or aver-
age costs of producing as the dependent variable and rely on cross-section data. The data for 
these studies were collected from 1960 to 2005. With only two exceptions the data are from 
developed economies. Corrected for sample size, the year in which the data were collected, 
functional form, type of service, geographic area, and longitudinal studies, the authors find no 
statistical evidence of different costs in the private versus public sector in either the garbage 
sector or in the water sector. The correction for the year of data collection indicates that older 
studies are more likely to find cost differences than more recent studies. Additionally, the 
authors find some indication of publication bias. That means that papers are more likely to be 
published when significant relationships are found. Results that are not significant are usually 
of minor interest. In concluding the authors state: “[…] our analysis provides empirical evi-
dence that private production of local services is not systematically less costly than that of 
public production. […] Moreover, we find some evidence of publication bias, which means 
that papers obtaining significant cost savings are more likely to be published. We also find 
cost differences to be less likely in more recent studies” (Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010, 572).  
Carvalho, Marques, and Berg (2012) also recently published a meta-regression that was based 
on production or cost estimates from earlier studies. The issues examined in this analysis are 
economies of scale and scope for water utilities. The sample utilized for the meta-regression 
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consisted of 35 world-spanning studies estimating economies of scale and 13 studies, exclud-
ing one from developed countries, estimating economies of scope. The data of the single stud-
ies stem form the years 1960 to 2010. The authors find the ownership variable, as well as the 
vast majority of the other independent variables in the regression model, to be statistically 
highly insignificant. Despite this finding these authors state: “Although not statistically sig-
nificant, publicly-owned utilities are more likely to have scale and scope diseconomies than 
when the ownership is mostly private” (Carvalho, Marques, and Berg 2012, 46). In our view 
such statements that are obviously based on belief rather than on evidence are highly unscien-
tific. Based on the actual statistical results of this study we have to conclude that ownership 
has no verifiable influence on scale and scope economies of water utilities. 
 
5. Discussion 
At first glance the surveys reported here, as well as the basic studies they rely on, provide 
(consistent with the patchy theoretical insights) very heterogeneous empirical evidence on the 
relative economic performance of public and privately owned enterprises. According to these 
findings the authors come to very different conclusions. However, a closer look at the matter 
allows the identification of some reasons for the seemingly confusing picture. Once accounted 
for this can allow us to find some structure in the findings.  
First of all, it should be noted that we can find some misinterpretations and mistakes in the 
literature on the topic. Some authors interpret specific studies as anti-public ownership, while 
others see the same study as pro or neutral. An example might be Hirsch’s (1965) study. Here 
the neutral conclusion is correct, because the standard error of the ownership-dummy is statis-
tically insignificant. Furthermore, there are simple mistakes in some of the surveys. For in-
stance, de Alessi (1974), Spann (1977), and Bennett and Johnson (1979, 1980) provide only 
small surveys and include none of their own studies. Nonetheless, in some surveys their work 
is taken as discrete studies. Thus these studies are counted repeatedly, on the one hand as 
stand-alone studies and secondly as an echo in different surveys. Another source of “double 
counting” is the fact that some authors published the results gained from one data set in two 
or more journals or anthologies. Some surveys do not account for this situation. Needless to 
say in some cases it is indeed difficult to classify a study. See for example Foreman-Peck and 
Waterson’s study (1985). Without regulation there is slight evidence that public enterprises 
may be slightly less efficient. Under a regulation regime there is no difference between public 
and private production.  
 - 17 - 
Without a revisited analysis of each single paper, which would mean in our context a careful 
review of hundreds of publications, it is difficult to say to what extent errors and mistakes 
affect the surveys and their interpretations. At the very least it is obvious that the choice of 
studies examined (and therefore the possibility of “sample selection bias”) has a profound 
influence on our perception. Each author compiled a specific data base. The different charac-
teristics of the samples explain a lot of the divergences in empirical results and conclusions. 
At least five of these characteristics are worthy of note. 
A first important factor is the period of observation. Compared to older works more recent 
studies reveal little, or at least less, difference between public and private enterprises (see e.g. 
Villalonga 2000; Bel and Warner 2010). A second aspect to consider is the regional prove-
nance of the data. In industrial countries there seems to be less discrepancy than in developing 
or transition economies. This is shown, for instance, by taking a closer look at the papers of 
Shirley and Walsh (2000), Willner (2001), and Bel, Fageda, and Warner (2010).  
Thirdly, the degree of competition seems to be meaningful. In a competitive environment the 
distinctions between public and private enterprise diminish or even disappear. This is the con-
clusion of several survey authors (Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider 1982; Domber-
ger and Pigott 1986; Pommerehne 1990; Pestieau and Tulkens 1993: Parker 2006). Yet some 
authors reach the opposite conclusion. They state that private enterprise is preferable in mar-
kets with full competition (see Yarrow 1986; Martin and Parker 1997).  
A fourth facet, which is interrelated with the region and the third item, is the existence of a 
workable regulation regime in response to a market failure. This factor is connected in turn 
with the role of specific assets, transaction costs, and missing or asymmetric information. 
Several authors find less or no advantage of private ownership provided that market failure 
exists (Yarrow 1986; Boardman and Vining 1989; Pommerehne 1990; Pestieau and Tulkens 
1993; Martin and Parker 1997; Parker 2006).  
A fifth, and in our view very important, consideration is the underlying economic perform-
ance indicator (see also Villalonga 2000). Especially with regard to performance measures we 
can observe, broadly speaking, two distinct branches of literature. On the one side is the “pro-
fit and earnings branch” represented by Boardman and Vining (1989) and Vining and Board-
man (1992) respectively, Megginson and Netter (2001), and others. On the other side there is 
the “productivity, cost efficiency, welfare branch” represented, for example, by Pestieau and 
Tulkens (1993), Willner (2001), and Bel and Warner (2008). Using financial performance 
measures such as profits and sales or related financial ratios increases the likelihood of “pro-
ducing” the superiority of private firms. In this context it should be stressed that the “profit 
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and earnings branch” call financial ratios like sales per employee or sales per asset “(operat-
ing) efficiency”. Therefore, their efficiency measure is quite different from the measure used 
by the “productivity, cost efficiency, welfare branch”. Employing instead the more adequate 
indicators “productive efficiency”, “cost efficiency”, and “welfare”, as argued above, in all 
likelihood leads public enterprises not to lose or even to win the contest.  
A promising approach for further research appears to be the adoption of meta-regressions 
analogous to the work of Bel, Warner, and Fageda (2010) on municipal garbage collection 
and water services. We would expect very similar results for other sectors, meaning that dif-
ferences in the empirical studies could be largely explained by region, branch, number of ob-
servations, time period, and so on.  
What then is the message for policy making in developed countries? Counter to the argument 
of Megginson and Netters (2001), the most cited publication on our topic18, research does not 
support the conclusion that privately owned firms are more efficient than otherwise-
comparable state-owned firms. The evidence is much more differentiated than the paper of 
Megginson and Netter and perhaps “simpleminded” (this expression was used by Stiglitz 
2008, XI) economics might suggest. Perhaps private firms are more profitable, but this is not 
the crucial point.  
From a normative economic point of view productivity and cost efficiency are adequate eco-
nomic performance indicators for public (and in this context private too) enterprises on a firm 
level. At present we have to generally expect that no significant microeconomic efficiency 
gain will be realized by privatization in industrialized countries. The most probable reason for 
this is the already mostly complete policy of opening up public services to competition. This 
policy forced managers of public entities to generate efficiency improvements in the last dec-
ades. Thus, maintaining appropriate levels of competition between different institutional ar-
rangements for delivering public services is recommended. Lastly, one must not forget the 
welfaristic or macroeconomic level. The choice between private and public enterprises may 
have secondary non-neglectable effects on consumer surplus, wealth distribution, quality of 
services, security of supply, or the nonmarket output. The empirical evidence from the priva-
tization campaign in Great Britain, for example, seems to show regressive distribution effects 
(see Florio 2004). Such distributive effects have to be balanced against pure efficiency 
changes. Since we have to expect that public enterprises are more likely to produce nonmarket 
                                                 
18  Google Scholar (April 22, 2013) returns 2273 citations for Megginson and Netter (2001), 266 citations for 
Shirley and Walsh (2000), 229 citations for Villalonga (2000), and 90 citations for Willner (2001). These 
numbers of citation are quiet comparable because the publications appeared nearly at the same time. 
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outputs, they should be more efficient from a two-dimensional point of view, holding market 
output constant.  
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